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Abstract
Within New Keynesian economics, the optimality of a monetary policy that aims at zero ination
is surprisingly robust. Full price stability is optimal despite the ine¢ ciency of the nonstochastic steady
state and the existence of a positively sloped long-run Phillips-curve trade-o¤. Even under ination
persistence due to backward-looking price indexation by price setters, zero ination remains optimal.
We show how backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters results in optimal positive
long-run ination. Comparing theoretical explanations for structural ination persistence, the features
that seem capable of delivering an endogenously optimal positive ination target are costly disination,
long-run Phillips-curve trade-o¤, and steady-state distortions.
JEL classi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It follows that the chances that a shock would push the nominal interest rate to zero are
negligible. This result poses the challenge for future researchers of nding a theoretical ex-
planation for the optimality of positive ination targets. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005, p.
52)
1 Introduction
There is much debate among both economists and central bankers about the appropriate ination target
for monetary policy. This paper contributes to the debate by analytically deriving the optimal, under
commitment, long-run ination target when there is structural ination persistence due to backward-
looking rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters, specied either à la Galì and Gertler (1999) or à la
Steinsson (2003).
The problem of what constitutes optimal ination in the long-run is not trivial as monetary policy
cannot simultaneously eliminate steady-state distortions and distortions resulting from staggered price-
setting1. Of course, discretionary conduct of monetary policy would result in the well-known ination
bias stressed by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983).
The combination of ine¢ cient nonstochastic steady state, from which stems the central banks desire
to stabilise output around a level that is higher than the ine¢ cient natural level of output (Friedman,
1968), and long-run Phillips-curve trade-o¤ makes positive ination forever in principles desirable as it
would result in positive output gap forever.
This paper owes a lot to the landmark contribution by Woodford (2003) as it builds upon the basic
neo-Wicksellian model. Furthermore, we employ many of the techniques used in that work such as the
utility-based framework for the evaluation of monetary policy and the concept of optimality from a timeless
perspective (Woodford, 1999).
This paper makes two distinct contributions to the literature on structural ination persistence and
optimal monetary policy.
First, we show how extending an otherwise basic New Keynesian model to the case of ination persis-
tence due to backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters breaks the surprising robustness
of zero long-run ination target, namely backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters results
in optimal positive long-run ination.
1Long-run and steady-state are used interchangeably in this paper.
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Second, comparing theoretical explanations for structural ination persistence, which share the as-
sumption of backward-looking behaviour, suggests that the features that seem capable of delivering an
endogenously optimal positive ination target are costly disination, long-run Phillips-curve trade-o¤,
and steady-state distortions.
It is often argued that the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (Roberts, 1995) dees belief as it cannot
explain ination persistence: once the factors bringing about high ination have passed, ination can
return immediately to target without incurring any loss in output. Since Fuhrer and Moore (1995) the
literature has been concerned with providing theoretical explanations for structural ination persistence.
A widely used explanation relies on the assumption that a subset of price setters behave in a backward-
looking manner2. Fuhrer and Moore (1995) appeal to a relative contracting model where nominal wages
are set so to match the relative wages of other workers. Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters
(2003) put forward a model with backward-looking price indexation where rms are continually indexing
prices to past ination between any two pricing decisions. Galì and Gertler (1999) and Steinsson (2003)
propose a model with rule-of-thumb behaviour where some price setters abide to a simple backward-
looking rule-of-thumb when resetting their prices.
Comparing these theoretical explanations for structural ination persistence, the features that seem
capable of delivering an endogenously optimal positive long-run ination target are costly disination,
long-run Phillips-curve trade-o¤, and steady-state distortions. Indeed, under backward-looking rule-of-
thumb behaviour by price setters, optimal steady-state ination is zero in the absence of backward-looking
rule-of-thumb behaviour, in the absence of long-run Phillips-curve trade-o¤, and in the absence of steady-
state distortions.
The importance of costly disination is established by comparing the optimal plan rst-order condition
for ination implied by backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour with the one that obtains in the basic
neo-Wicksellian model with backward-looking price indexation. The relevance of a long-run Phillips-curve
trade-o¤ is established by comparing the hybrid Phillips curve that obtains in Fuhrer and Moores relative
contracting model vis-a-vis the one reported in Walsh (2003).
The remainder of the paper is organised in three sections. Section 2 presents the theoretical economy.
Section 3 studies the long-run ination target under the optimal commitment policy. Section 4 provides
concluding remarks.
2A second explanation hinges on ination expectations not being formed rationally. See Woodford (2007) and the refer-
ences therein.
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2 The Model
The New Keynesian model laid out here is the basic neo-Wicksellian model in Woodford (2003). It shares
the basic neo-Wicksellian models notation3, assumptions, and general formalism. It integrates it with the
hybrid Phillips curve and the central banks objective that obtain under backward-looking rule-of-thumb
behaviour by price setters, specied either à la Galì and Gertler (1999) or à la Steinsson (2003)4.
2.1 Households and market structure
There is a continuum of households of size one. The representative household seeks to maximize a
discounted sum of utility of the form
E0
1X
t=0
tUt  E0
1X
t=0
t
24u (Ct; t)  1Z
0
v(ht(i); t)di
35 (1)
where 0 <   1 is the discount factor, Ct is an aggregate of the households consumption of each of the
individual goods that are supplied (indexed by i over the unit interval), t is a vector of exogenous real
shocks (i.e. exogenous shocks to households impatience to consume and to the households willingness to
supply labour), and ht(i) is the supply of type i labour.
Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), the consumption aggregate is dened as
Ct =
24 1Z
0
ct(i)
( 1)=di
35=( 1) (2)
where ct(i) is the consumption of good i and  > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution between
goods. For any given realisation of t, the period utility function, u (Ct; t), is assumed to be concave and
strictly increasing in Ct whereas the period disutility of supplying labour of type i, v(ht(i); t), is assumed
to be convex and increasing in ht(i). Furthermore, we assume specic labour markets, namely type i
labour is only used in the production of good i , and that the representative household simultaneously
supplies all types of labour.
3This is precisely true for all variables and structural parameters but two. First, we denote with ! the degree of backward-
looking rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters rather than the elasticity of real marginal cost with respect to own output,
which we denote with $. Second, to avoid confusion with the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the period t hybrid
Phillips Curve, 't, we denote with % the parameter vector that indexes aspects of policy that determine steady-state values
of ination and output gap,  and x.
4The hybrid Phillips curve and the central banks objective in the case of backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour a là
Steinsson (2003) correct the ones reported in Steinsson (2003). The hybrid Phillips curve and the central banks objective in
the case of backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour a là Galì and Gertler (1999) coincide (up to x) with the ones reported
in Amato and Laubach (2003). A literally step-by-step derivation is available upon request.
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We assume full nancial markets, such that, through risk sharing, households face the same budget
constraint, which is given by
1Z
0
pt(i)ct(i)di+ Et [Qt;t+1Bt+1]  Bt +
1Z
0
wt(i)ht(i)di+
1Z
0
t(i)di  Tt (3)
where pt(i) is the price of good i , Bt is the nominal value of nancial wealth brought into the period,
Qt;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for one period ahead payo¤, Tt is net nominal tax collection by the
Government, wt(i) is the nominal wage for labour of type i , and t(i) is the nominal prots from sales
of good i. The budget constraint states that, in any period, nancial wealth carried into the subsequent
period plus consumption cannot be worth more than the value of nancial wealth brought into the period
plus after-tax nonnancial income earned during the period. Note that we assume that every household
owns an equal share of all the rms operating in the economy. The assumption of complete nancial
markets implies that the assumed rms ownership and the ction that the representative household
supplies all types of labour directly are innocuous; dropping the assumptions would not change the
conditions that determine equilibrium prices and quantities.
Optimal households behaviour is described by three sets of requirements.
First, households face a decision in each period about how much to consume of each individual good.
They adjust the share of a particular good in their consumption bundle so to exploit any di¤erence in the
relative price. Minimising the level of total expenditure, given the consumption aggregate in (2), yields
the demand for each individual good
ct(i) =

pt(i)
Pt
 
Ct (4)
where the aggregate price level, Pt, is given by
Pt =
24 1Z
0
pt(i)
1 di
351=1  (5)
This specication of the price index has by construction the property that PtCt gives the minimum price
for which an amount Ct of the aggregate consumption can be purchased.
Market clearing implies that the total nonnancial income (i.e. the economy-wide sales revenues) can
be written as PtYt where Yt is an aggregate of the quantities supplied of the various di¤erentiated goods,
dened as in (2). The budget constraint can thus be rewritten as
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PtCt + Et [Qt;t+1Bt+1]  Bt + PtYt   Tt (6)
The absence of arbitrage opportunities implies that there exists a unique stochastic discount factor,
Qt;t+1. The riskless short-term nominal interest rate, it, has a simple representation in terms of the
stochastic discount factor, namely 1=(1 + it) = Et [Qt;t+1]. A complete description of the households
budget constraint requires ruling out Ponzi schemes. The implied constraint for nancial wealth carried
into the subsequent period, Bt+1, is given by
Bt+1   
1X
T=t+1
Et+1 [Qt+1;T (PtYt   Tt)] <1 (7)
with certainty, that is, in each state of the world that may be reached in the subsequent period. (7) implies
that a households debt in any state of the world is bounded by the present value of all future after-tax
nonnancial income, which is assumed to be nite. Furthermore, preventing unlimited consumption also
requires that the nominal interest rate satises the zero lower bound, it  0, at all times: a negative
nominal interest rate would in fact allow to nance unbounded consumption by selling enough bonds.
The entire innite series of ow budget constraints and borrowing constraints in turn denes the lifetime
budget constraint for the household
1X
t=0
E0Q0;t [PtCt]  B0 +
1X
t=0
E0Q0;t [(PtYt   Tt)] (8)
We can now complete the description of optimal household behaviour. Maximising utility (1) subject
to the intertemporal budget constraint (8) delivers the familiar Euler equation for consumption
Et
"
uc
 
Ct+1; t+1

uc (Ct; t)
Pt
Pt+1
#
=
1
1 + it
(9)
and the optimal supply of labour of type i
vh(ht(i); t)
uc (Ct; t)
=
wt(i)
Pt
(10)
where uc and vh denote respectively the partial derivative of u with respect to the level of consumption
and the partial derivative of v with respect to the supply of labour. Rational consumers are attempting
to smooth consumption over time such that the marginal utility of consumption is equal across periods.
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2.2 Firms
We assume that each good i has the linearly homogeneous production function
yt(i) = Atht(i) (11)
where At is an exogenous technology factor. It follows that the nominal marginal cost of supplying a
quantity yt(i) of good i is given by
MCt(i) = wt(i)A
 1
t (12)
Note that the assumption of specic labour markets does not imply that each price setter is a
monopsonist in her labour market. The possibility of rms having any market power in their labour
market is ruled out by assuming that price setters that change their prices at the same time also hire labour
from the same market. Specically, this is achieved by assuming a double continuum of di¤erentiated
goods, indexed by (I , j) with an elasticity of substitution of  between any two goods. Goods belonging
to the same industry (i.e. with the same index I) are then assumed to change their prices at the same
time and to be produced using the same type of labour (type I labour)5. The fact that now a continuum
of price setters demand type I labour eliminates the possibility of market power in their labour market
without any change for the degree of market power of each price setter in her product market.
Substituting (10) in (12) yields the real marginal cost specication
mc(yt(i);Ct;et)  MCt(i)Pt = vh(yt(i)=At; t)uc (Ct; t)At (13)
where labour is expressed in terms of output and et denotes the vector of exogenous disturbances, which
includes exogenous real shocks to technology, to households impatience to consume, and to the households
willingness to supply labour.
2.3 Market clearing
Goods market clearing requires, for each good i and at all times
yt(i) = ct(i) + gt(i) (14)
5The Calvo lottery is over industriesprices rather than goodsprices.
7
equivalently, in aggregate terms
Yt = Ct +Gt (15)
where Gt, which is such that Gt < Yt at all dates, is the exogenous process that describes Government
purchases of the aggregate good.
Substituting the market clearing condition into (9) and (13) yields the equilibrium conditions
Et
"euc(Yt+1;et+1)euc(Yt;et) PtPt+1
#
=
1
1 + it
(16)
mct(i) = mc(yt(i);Yt;et) = evy(yt(i);et)euc(Yt;et) (17)
where eu(Yt;et)  u(Yt   Gt; t) and ev(yt(i);et)  v(yt(i)=At; t) are the indirect utility functions. The
former, which is increasing and concave in Yt for each possible realisation of vector et, indicates the utility
ow to the representative household as a function of its aggregate demand for resources, where aggregate
demand adds the households share of Government purchases to the households private consumption.
Under the assumption of Gt being exogenously determined, variations in the level of Government expen-
diture are simply another source of exogenous variation in the Euler equation for consumption6. The
latter, which is increasing and convex in yt(i) for each possible realisation of vector et, converts the house-
holds disutility of supplying labour used for the production of good i into the households disutility of
directly supplying good i. Accordingly, the model laid out here is identical to the one that obtains under
the assumption of a single yeoman farmer (i.e. continuum of yeoman farmers).
We now turn to the description of pricesetting behaviour. Following Calvo (1983), we assume that
only a fraction 1    of industriesprices are reset in each period. The probability of not resetting the
price in each period, 0 <  < 1, is independent of both the time that has gone by since the last price
revision and the misalignment between the actual price and the price that would be optimal to charge,
namely pricing decisions in any period are independent of past pricing decisions. Furthermore, we assume
that prots are discounted using a stochastic discount factor that equals on average . Firms allowed to
change their price at time t set it so to maximise expected future prots subject to the demand they face.
6Henceforth, the vector et includes exogenous real shocks to technology, to Government purchases, to households impa-
tience to consume, and to the households willingness to supply labour.
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The price setters objective is given by
Et
1X
s=0
()s(pt(i); p
I
t+s; Pt+s; Yt+s;
et+s) (18)
The price setters nominal prot function, , is linearly homogeneous in its rst three arguments (i.e.
goods price, industrys price, pIt , and aggregate price level) and, for any value of the industry price and
the aggregate price level, single-peaked for some positive value of the goods price7.
We now depart from full rationality by introducing backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour by price
setters. Following Galì and Gertler (1999), we assume that only a fraction 1   ! of industries behave
optimally (i.e. in a forward-looking manner) when setting the price, the remaining fraction of industries
use the same backward-looking rule-of-thumb when revising their prices. The degree of backward-looking
rule-of-thumb behaviour, 0  ! < 1, is thus constant over time and price setters cannot switch between
backward-looking and forward-looking behaviour.
If follows that in each period all forward-looking price setters will set the same price, which we denote
with pft , and all backward-looking price setters will as well charge a common price, which we denote with
pbt . The common forward-looking reset price, p
f
t , is implicitly dened by the relation
Et
1X
s=0
sQt;t+s1(p
f
t ; p
f
t ; Pt+s; Yt+s;
et+s) = 0 (19)
where 1(p
f
t ; p
f
t ; Pt+s; Yt+s;
et+s) = 0 (i.e. the rst-order condition for optimal pricing by all the suppliers
of good i, which belongs to industry I) implicitly denes what Woodford (2003) labels the notional Short-
Run Aggregate Supply curve. The common rule-of-thumb backward-looking reset price, pbt , is specied as
in Steinsson (2003)
pbt = p

t 1
Pt 1
Pt 2

Yt 1
Y nt 1

(20)
where 0    1 is the degree of indexation to past demand conditions. Rule-of-thumb price setters thus
index the previous period overall reset price, pt 1, to past ination (fully) and past demand conditions
7Under (11), the nominal prot function is given by
(pt(i); p
I
t ; Pt; Yt;et)  pt(i)yt(i)  wIt ht(i)  pt(i)pt(i)Pt
 
Yt   vh(
 
pIt=Pt
 
Yt=At); t)
uc (Ct; t)
Pt

pt(i)
Pt
 
Yt
At
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(according to ). The aggregate price level hence evolves according to
Pt =
n
(1  )(pt )1  + P 1 t 1
o 1
1 
(21)
where
pt = (1  !)pft + !pbt (22)
denotes the overall reset price.
2.4 Log-linearised model
Prot-maximising behaviour under perfectly exible prices (i.e. all industries adjust prices optimally each
period, taking the path of aggregate variables as given) implies that rms will operate at the point at
which the relative price is a mark-up over the real marginal cost
pt(i)
Pt
= mc(yt(i);Yt;et) (23)
where  = =1   > 1 is the desired constant mark-up. The relative supply of good i must satisfy

yt(i)
Yt
 1=
= mc(yt(i);Yt;et) (24)
In a symmetric equilibrium, each good is supplied in the same quantity, which we denote with Yt.
Equilibrium output is then given by Yt = Y nt (et), where the natural level of output, Y nt (et), is implicitly
dened by
mc(Y nt ;Y
n
t ;
et) =  1 (25)
In the case of fully exible prices, equilibrium output equals the natural level of output at all times. The
natural level of output in turn depends only on the exogenous real shocks, namely equilibrium output
under perfectly exible prices is completely independent of monetary policy.
The natural steady-state level of output is the equilibrium level of output that obtains in the absence
of sticky prices and in the absence of exogenous real shocks (i.e. et = 0 at all times). The natural
steady-state level of output, Y , is implicitly dened by
10
mc(Y ;Y ; 0) =  1 (26)
Henceforth, we log-linearise the structural equations around the natural steady-state level of output,
Y . If et = 0 and Yt = Y at all times, (21) has a solution with zero ination at all times (i.e. Pt = pt =
pft = p
b
t = Pt 1 = P at all times). In the case of small enough uctuations in et and Yt around 0 and Y
respectively, the solution to the log-linear approximate model is one in which any variables log-deviation
from its natural steady-state value (for instance, bPt  log(Pt=P )) remains always close to 08.
Log-linearising (16) yields the intertemporal expectational IS relation
bYt = Et bYt+1    hbit   Ett+1    1(gt   Etgt+1)i (27)
where bit  log[(1 + it)=(1 + i)], t  bPt   bPt 1  log(Pt=Pt 1),    eu(euccY ) 1 > 0 measures the
constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution of aggregate expenditure, and the disturbance term gt 
 euct(euccY ) 1 indicates the percentage variation in output required to keep the marginal utility of
expenditure at its natural steady-state level (given shocks to Government purchases and to households
impatience to consume).
Log-linearising (17) yields
cmct(i) = $ (byt(i)  qt) +  1(bYt   gt) (28)
where cmct(i)  log(mct(i)=), $  evyyY ev 1y > 0 measures the constant elasticity of real marginal cost
with respect to own output, and the disturbance term qt   evyet(evyyY ) 1 indicates the percentage
variation in output required to keep the marginal disutility of labour supply at its natural steady-state
level (given shocks to technology and to the households willingness to supply labour).
Under perfectly exible prices, (28) reduces to
log

 1
 1

= $
bY nt   qt+  1(bY nt   gt) (29)
Solving for bY nt  log(Y nt =Y ) yields
bY nt = $qt +  1gt$ +  1 (30)
8Henceforth, a variables log-deviation from its natural steady-state value, which is denoted with a bar, is denoted with
a hat.
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In the presence of a constant elasticity of substitution, percentage uctuations in the natural level of output
are equal to the percentage uctuations in the e¢ cient level of output, namely the equilibrium level of
output under perfect competition and perfectly exible prices. The e¢ cient level of output, Y t (et), is
implicitly dened by
mc(Y t ;Y

t ;
et) = 1 (31)
Accordingly, the e¢ cient steady-state level of output, Y

, is implicitly dened by
mc(Y

;Y

; 0) = 1 (32)
Using (28), percentage uctuations in the e¢ cient level of output are then given by
bY t = $qt +  1gt$ +  1 (33)
which equals percentage uctuations in the natural level of output (i.e. (30)).
The natural steady-state level of output, Y , can be rewritten as
mc(Y ;Y ; 0) =  1  1  y (34)
where the parameter y summarises the distortions in the natural steady-state level of output due to
monopolistic competition. When y is small enough, the steady-state (i.e. constant over time) e¢ ciency
gap, x  log(Y =Y ) = O (kyk), can be log-linearised as
log(Y

=Y ) =
y
$ +  1
(35)
Output gap, xt  bYt   bY nt  log(Yt=Y nt ), is the deviation of actual output from the natural level of
output. (27) can be expressed in terms of output gap as
xt = Etxt+1   
bit   Ett+1   brnt  (36)
where
brnt =  1 h(gt   bY nt )  Et(gt+1   bY nt+1)i (37)
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is the natural rate of interest, namely the real interest rate consistent with output equalling the natural
level of output at all times. The interest rate gap, brt   brnt (with brt = bit   Ett+1), thus indicates the
e¤ects on the actual level of output due to sticky prices.
We can now turn to the aggregate supply function. The aggregate ination rate, t, and the aggregate
output gap, xt, in any period satisfy an aggregate supply relation of the form9
t = fEtt+1 + bt 1 + 1xt + 2xt 1 (38)
with
 = + !   (1  )!;f =


;b =
!

;2 =
(1  )!

(39)
1 =
(1  !)  (1  )!

; =
(1  )(1  )( 1 +$)
(1 +$)
If ! = 0, (38) and (39) collapse to Woodford (2003, 2:12 and 2:13, p. 187). If the fraction ! is reset
according to backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour à la Galì-Gertler (1999) (i.e.  = 0), (38), standing
(39), collapses to
t = fEtt+1 + bt 1 + 1xt (40)
2.5 Central banks loss function
In the case of small enough uctuations in the production of each good around the natural steady-state
level of output, small enough exogenous real shocks, and small enough steady-state distortions, the period
utility Ut can be approximated to second order as in Woodford (2003, 2:13, p. 396)
Ut =  Y euc
2

( 1 +$)(xt   x)2 + (1 +$)vari log pt(i)

+ t:i:p+O
y;e; %3 (41)
where vari log pt(i) is a measure of the degree of price dispersion across industries (i.e. goods), t:i:p
collect terms that are independent of monetary policy (i.e. irrelevant to the welfare ranking of alternative
equilibria), and % is the parameter vector that indexes aspects of policy that determine the steady-state
values of ination and output gap,  and x. In addition to stabilising output gap, around a level that
exceeds the ine¢ cient natural level of output by the steady-state e¢ ciency gap, it is also appropriate for
monetary policy to aim to curb price dispersion. This is achieved by stabilising the aggregate price level,
9See Appendix A.
13
but how uctuations in the general price level a¤ect price dispersion, hence welfare, depend upon the
details of the pricesetting10.
The discounted sum of utility of the representative household can then be approximated to second-
order by
1X
t=0
tUt =  

1X
t=0
t
264 2t + 1(xt   x)2
+2 [t   (t 1 + (1  )xt 1)]2
375+ t:i:p+Oy;e; %;1=2 1 3 (42)
The denition of  in (39) holds. The constant 
 is given by 
 = Y euc( 1+$)=2. The relative weight
on output uctuations is given by 1 = =. The relative weight on [t   (t 1 + (1  )xt 1)]2 is given
by 2 = != [(1  !)]. If ! = 0, (42) collapses to Woodford (2003, 2:21 and 2:22, p. 400). In the presence
of backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour a là Galì-Gertler (1999) (i.e.  = 0), (42) collapses to
1X
t=0
tUt =  

1X
t=0
t

2t + 1(xt   x)2 + 2(t   t 1)2

+ t:i:p+O
y;e; %;1=2 1 3 (43)
Interestingly, in the presence of backward-looking rule-of thumb behaviour by price setters, the utility-
based central banks loss function can now be seen as penalising variations in ination as well as variations
in the di¤erence between general ination and rule-of-thumb price increases.
3 The Optimal Long-run Ination
Following the theoretical literature on optimal monetary policy, we assume that the central banks policy
instrument is the short-term nominal interest rate. The assumption reects the actual practice of monetary
policy by large central banks such as the European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve, and the Bank
of England. The combination of cashless economy (i.e. there are no costs associated with varying the
nominal interest rate) and centrals bank control of the nominal interest rate implies that the intertemporal
expectational IS relation imposes no real constraint on the central bank. Given the central banks optimal
choices for ination and output gap, the expectational IS equation simply determines the path of nominal
interest rate necessary to achieve the optimal path for the output gap. As a consequence, it is more
convenient to treat output gap as if it were the central banks policy instrument. The analysis is conducted
in a purely deterministic setting, certainty equivalence guarantees that the results obtained hold in the
presence of random disturbances.
10See Appendix A.
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Under the optimal commitment policy, the central bank chooses paths for ination and output gap to
minimise the future discounted sum of losses from date 0 (i.e. when the policy is implemented) onward
subject to the constraint that the paths must satisfy the aggregate supply relation each period. In the
basic neo-Wicksellian model, the hybrid Phillips curve, namely a log-linear approximation to the model
structural equations, su¢ ces for a correct linear approximation to the optimal commitment policy only
in the case of small steady-state distortions (i.e. x is small enough). Given the assumed deterministic
setting, the solution for the optimal paths of ination and output is accurate up to a residual that is only
of second order. This is enough for a characterisation of the rst-order consequences of allowing for the
empirically realistic case of steady-state distortions (i.e. for ine¢ ciency of the natural rate of output).
Precisely, we analytically derive the unique long-run ination targets that are optimal from a timeless
perspective, .
A constant ination target  is optimal from a timeless perspective if the problem of min-
imising the discounted sum of losses subject to the constraint that the bounded sequences,
ft; xtg1t=0, satisfy the aggregate supply curve for each t  0, and the additional constraint
that 0 = , has a solution in which t =  for all t. Woodford (2003, p. 475).
The two commitment policies (i.e. timeless-perspective and zero-optimal) in the literature di¤er
as the requirement that 0 =  under timeless-perspective is replaced by the initial condition ' 1 =
0 (i.e. no fullment of expectations existing prior to the policy implementation) in the case of zero-
optimal commitment policy. The two commitment policies in the literature thus share the same target11.
Accordingly, we also assume that both ination and output gap in the period before policy is implemented
(i.e. date  1) are at their values of zero (i.e. the optimal paths for ination and output gap are at at
their respective long-run optimal targets). As long as ination at date  1 is nonzero, and/or output gap
at date  1 is nonzero under Steinssons rule-of-thumb, backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour implies
that the optimal commitment policy, either zero-optimal or timeless-perspective, involves transition paths
for ination and the output gap to their respective long-run targets.
Under backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters a là Steinsson (2003), a central bank
acting under commitment faces the problem of choosing bounded deterministic paths for ination and
the output gap, ft; xtg1t=0, to minimise (42) subject to the constraint that the sequences must satisfy
(38) each period. We form the following Lagrangian.
11There is a unique optimal long-run ination target. Hence, we can refer to it as the optimal long-run ination (i.e.
optimal steady-state ination).
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L =
1X
t=0
t
8><>:
1
2
2
t +
1
2 (xt   x)2 + 22 [t   (t 1 + (1  )xt 1)]2
+'t

t   ft+1   bt 1   1xt   2xt 1

9>=>; (44)
where 't is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the hybrid Phillips Curve. Di¤erentiating with
respect to t and xt, we get the two rst-order conditions
t + 2 [t   (t 1 + (1  )xt 1)]  2 [t+1   (t + (1  )xt)] + 't   f't 1   b't+1 = 0 (45)
1(xt   x)  2(1  ) [t+1   (t + (1  )xt)]  1't   2't+1 = 0 (46)
for each t  0.
Proposition 1 Consider a cashless economy with exible wages, Calvo pricing, backward-looking rule-
of-thumb behaviour a là Steinsson (2003) by price setters, and no real disturbances. Assume that the
initial price dispersion of prices  1  var

log 1(I)
	
is small, initial ination is zero  1 = 0, initial
output gap is zero x 1 = 0, and steady-state distortions (measured by y) are small as well, so that an an
approximation to the welfare of the representative household of the form (42) is possible, with the steady-
state e¢ ciency gap, x, a small parameter (x = O(kyk)). Then, at least among ination paths in which
ination remains forever in a certain interval around zero, there is a unique policy that is optimal from
a timeless perspective. Under this policy, the positive optimal long-run ination is given by
 =
(1  )(1  ) 1! [(1  !)+ (1  )(1  )!]8><>: (1  !)(1  )(
 1   )(1  )2!+
(1  !)+ (1  )2! [(1  !)+ (1  )(1  )!]
9>=>;
x +O(
1=2 1 ;y2) (b)
Under backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters a là Galì and Gertler (1999) (i.e.  = 0),
the positive optimal long-run ination is given by
 =
(1  )(1  )!
(1  !)+ (1  )(1  )2!x
 +O(
1=2 1 ;y2) (a)
Under backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters, optimal steady-state ination is zero in
the absence of backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour (i.e. ! = 0), in the absence of long-run Phillips
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curve trade o¤ (i.e.  = 1), and in the absence of steady-state distortions (i.e. x = 0).
Proof. See appendix B
The combination of steady-state distortions, from which stems the central banks desire to stabilise
output around a level that is higher than the ine¢ cient natural level of output, and long-run Phillips-curve
trade-o¤ makes positive ination forever in principles desirable as it would result in positive output gap
forever.
Positive ination forever obtains if and only if there is a steady-state incentive for positive ination,
namely the stimulative e¤ect of ination on output is not o¤set by the output cost of ination. In all
the variants of the basic neo-Wicksellian model, the optimal plan rst-order condition for output gap
determines a positive relationship between the long-run value of the Lagrange multiplier, ', and the
long-run value of the output gap, x. Precisely, ' is found to be a positive function of the di¤erence
between the long-run value of the output gap and the steady-state e¢ ciency gap, x. Analysing the
absence/presence of long-run incentive for positive ination thus amounts to consider whether there is a
steady-state relationship between ination and the Lagrange multiplier. If the stimulative e¤ect of higher
ination on output is greater than the output cost of higher ination,  would then be negatively related
to '. Hence, optimal long-run ination would be found to be a positive function of the steady-state
e¢ ciency gap. In what follows, we are analysing the optimal plan rst-order condition for ination so to
check whether the coe¢ cients on the Lagrange multipliers add up to zero.
In the basic neo-Wicksellian model with backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour a là Galì and
Gertler (1999) the optimal plan implies that ination evolves according to (94)12. Substituting for f
and b in terms of structural parameters yields
t + 2(t   t 1)  2(t+1   t) + 't  


't 1  
!

't+1 = 0 (47)
Higher ination in any period results in output increase in the same period, 't, and reduction in output in
both the previous period as a result of expected higher ination, (=)'t 1, and the subsequent period,
(!=)'t 1. Recalling that    + ! [1  (1  )] ; the absolute value of the overall output cost of
higher ination in any period is given by
+ !
+ ! [1  (1  )] (48)
12See appendix B.
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Checking the relationship between the stimulative e¤ect of higher ination on output and the output cost
of higher ination amounts to solve the inequality
1  + !
+ ! [1  (1  )] (49)
The solution is given by
!(1  )(1  )  0 (50)
Note that (50) equally applies to the basic neo-Wicksellian model with backward-looking rule-of-thumb
behaviour a là Steinsson (2003) as the Lagrange multipliers enter the optimal plan rst-order condition
for ination in the same way. Backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour results in the stimulative e¤ect
of higher ination being generally greater than the output cost of higher ination. Not surprisingly, the
stimulative e¤ect of higher ination equals the output cost of higher ination in the absence of backward-
looking rule-of-thumb behaviour (i.e. ! = 0) or in the absence of long-run Phillips curve trade o¤ (i.e.
 = 1). Otherwise, there exists a long-run incentive for positive ination and the optimal long-run
ination, , is then found to be a positive function of the steady-state e¢ ciency gap, x.
In the purely forward-looking basic neo-Wicksellian model, the optimal plan implies that ination
evolves according to
t + 't   't 1 = 0 (51)
The increase in output in any period caused by higher ination in the same period, 't, is thus o¤set by
the cost of the reduction in output in the previous period as a result of expected higher ination, 't 1.
Hence, there is no long-run incentive for positive ination, the optimal long-run ination is zero.
The same conclusion holds in the basic neo-Wicksellian model with backward-looking price indexation.
As in Woodford (2003, Ch. 6, Ch. 7), the conclusion can be reached directly from the result for the Calvo
pricesetting. Alternatively, the optimal plan implies that ination evolves according to
(t   t 1)  (t   t 1) + 't   't 1 + 't   't+1 = 0 (52)
As in the purely-forward looking basic neo-Wicksellian model, the increase in output in any period resulting
from higher ination in the same period, 't, is o¤set by the cost of the reduction in output in the previous
period as a result of expected higher ination, 't 1. Moreover, the additional increase in output in any
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period resulting from ination in the same period, 't, is also o¤set by the reduction in output in the
subsequent period, 't+1. Once again, there is no long-run incentive for positive ination, the optimal
steady-state ination is zero.
Fuhrer and Moores relative contracting model implies an hybrid Phillips curve of the form
t = (1  ")Ett+1 + "t 1 + knxt (53)
whereas the hybrid Phillips curve reported in Walsh (2003, 5:65, p. 242) is given by
t = (1  ")Ett+1 + "t 1 + knxt (54)
where " is a measure of the degree of backward-looking behaviour in pricesetting13. It is interesting to
note that under n = 1, n = 1, and f + b = 1 (i.e. (1   ") = f and " = b) (40) coincides
with (54). f + b = 1 is then satised for !(1   ) = 0, namely the sum of the coe¢ cients on future
expected ination and lagged ination in the hybrid Phillips curve implied by backward-looking rule-of-
thumb behaviour by price setters, specied either à la Galì and Gertler (1999) or à la Steinsson (2003),
is generally greater than one. Given the rigour of mathematics (i.e.  = 0 is outside the range for ),
the coe¢ cients on future expected ination and lagged ination add up to one only in the absence of
backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour (i.e. ! = 0) or in the absence of long-run Phillips curve trade
o¤ (i.e.  = 1).
It must be stressed that (54) is simply the NKPC augmented with lagged ination: the motivation
for ination persistence in (54) is purely empirical. The two Phillips curves di¤er only for one respect:
(54) displays a long-run Phillips-curve trade-o¤, (53) does not. Assuming the monetary policy objective
1X
t=0
t

2t + n(xt   x)2

(55)
the optimal steady-state ination is then easily seen to be given by14
 =
(1  )"nn
2n + (1  ")(1  )2"n
x (c)
Given kn > 0 and n > 0, optimal long-run ination is always positive and collapses to zero in the absence
13We use " in both Phillips curves because the only goal at hand is stressing the importance of a long-run Phillips-curve
trade-o¤.
14See Appendix C.
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of backward-looking behaviour in pricesetting (i.e. " = 0), in the absence of steady-state distortions (i.e.
x = 0), and in the absence of long-run Phillips curve trade o¤ (i.e.  = 1, namely when 53 replaces 54).
3.1 Calibration
Equation (a) contains six structural parameters (, , , $,  1, !) for which values must be specied15.
Four parameters are chosen to equal those used by Woodford (2003, p. 431), which stem from the
estimation results in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). These values are given in Table 1.
Structural parameter   $  1
Value 0:99 7:88 0:47 0:16
Table 1. Benchmark structural estimates (quarterly)
The steady-state e¢ ciency gap, x, is accordingly set equal to 0:2, which is the value implied by
x = y=($+ 1), namely the steady-state distortions are only due to monopolistic competition. Letting
 and ! vary over their respective ranges, annualized percentage optimal steady-state ination is then
observed to spike for low values of , which are empirically unrealistic. Figure 1 thus reports the annualized
percentage optimal steady-state ination for empirically realistic values of the degree of price stickiness
(between 2 and 5 quarters, 0:5    0:8). As for !, Galì and Gertler (1999) report estimates of !
between 0:077 and 0:552, but we extend the range up to ! = 0:7, which implies that the hybrid Phillips
curve corresponds closely to the one in Fuhrer and Moore (1995) (i.e. " = 0:5).
The deviation from full price stability is observed to be minimal. In e¤ect, in developed countries
ination targets vary between 2% and 4% per year whereas slightly higher targets are observed in devel-
oping countries. However, low levels of annualized optimal steady-state ination hinge on the extremely
low relative weight on output uctuations (i.e. 1 = 0:003 under the benchmark structural estimates).
Indeed, (c), which, under the three conditions above, generalises (a), is easily seen to be increasing in
n. Equation (c) contains ve parameters (, ", n, n, x) for which values must be specied. Keeping
 and x set equal to 0:99 and 0:2 respectively, the remaining parameters are chosen to equal those used
in Walsh (2003, p. 527, p. 539). These values are given in table 2.
Parameter " n n
Value 0:5 0:25 0:05
Table 2. Benchmark estimates (quarterly)
15Under Steinssons rule-of-thumb the structural parameters are seven (, , , , $,  1, !). Given the absence of an
estimate for , we focus on Galì and Gertlers rule-of-thumb. Note that we use the same terminology in Altissimo et al.
(2006) thus distinguishing between estimates and structural estimates.
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Under benchmark estimates, optimal steady-state ination is 1:995% per year. Figure 2 reports the
annualized percentage optimal steady-state ination for values of " up to 0:7 and values of n up to 0:516.
4 Conclusion and Discussion
This paper makes two distinct contributions to the literature on structural ination persistence and
optimal monetary policy.
First, we show how backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters, specied either à
la Galì and Gertler (1999) or à la Steinsson (2003), breaks the surprising robustness of zero long-run
ination target, namely backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters results in optimal
positive long-run ination.
The result gives a blow to skepticism about the application of existing New Keynesian models to policy
advice and to empirical analysis. New Keynesian economics is undoubtedly providing a major input to
our understanding of how central banks and governments interact in the macroeconomic policy arena,
using their own policy instruments.
Second, comparing theoretical explanations for structural ination persistence, which share the as-
sumption of backward-looking behaviour, suggests that the features that seem capable of delivering an
endogenously optimal positive ination target are costly disination, long-run Phillips-curve trade-o¤,
and steady-state distortions.
On the one hand, this paper highlights the trickiness of microfounding structural ination persistence;
on the other hand, costly disination seems capable of bringing the short-run in line with the long-run.
Given a long-run Phillips-curve trade-o¤, the dichotomy short-run and long-run is, to say the least,
weakened. Arguably, the biggest virtue of New Keynesian economics is having tackled the conventional
wisdom regarding the steady-state Phillips curve.
Last but not least, this paper reveals that the widespread practice in the New Keynesian literature
on optimal monetary policy of restricting the attention to the case of an e¢ cient nonstochastic steady
state is far from being innocuous . What we show here is that a policy that is optimal for an economy
with an e¢ cient steady state di¤ers from what is optimal in an economy where the empirically unrealistic
subsidies that achieve Pareto e¢ ciency are unavailable. Overall, scal policy shall not be assumed to fully
o¤set steady-state distortions, scal policy can either exacerbate or ameliorate steady-state distortions.
16The annualized percentage optimal steady-state ination is an arithmetic progression in ".
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The result is obviously sensitive to Calvos (1983) assumption of a constant probability of price ad-
justment, irrespective of the duration of prices. Sheedy (2007a) drops such assumption and derives a
simple and tractable expression for the Phillips curve that exhibits intrinsic ination persistence. Ina-
tion persistence is intrinsic, rather than structural, in the sense that ination determination is partially
backward-looking even though all agents remain forward-looking. Sheedy (2007b) goes on to analyse
optimal monetary policy in response to shocks, but the steady state he considers is Pareto e¢ cient. Ex-
tending the analysis to the case of an ine¢ cient steady state is a natural way to conrm the importance
of steady-state distortions for the optimality of positive ination targets.
It should be stressed however that the model studied in this paper is a basic closed economy New
Keynesian model. Papers such as Khan et al. (2003) and Altig et al. (2005) also consider other features
such as transaction frictions, wage stickiness, capital goods, and investment in addition to price stickiness.
In future research, we are particularly interested in extending the analysis to a model that is capable to
account fairly well for business-cycle uctuations.
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6 Figures
Figure 1: The annualized percentage optimal steady-state ination as a function of  and !.
Figure 2: The annualized percentage optimal steady-state ination as a function of " and n.
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7 Appendix A. Derivations
7.1 The hybrid Phillips curve
(21) can be log-linearised as bPt = (1  )bpt +  bPt 1 (56)
with
bpt = (1  !)bpft + !bpbt (57)
A log-linearisation to the notional SRAS is given by
log(pft =Pt) = xt (58)
where  is the elasticity of the notional SRAS curve, which, under the assumption of specic labour
markets, is given by  = ( 1 + $) (1 +$) 1 > 0. Substituting (58) in (19) and quasi-di¤erencing
yields
bpft = (1  )xt + (1  ) bPt + Etbpft+1 (59)
Log-linearising (20) yields
bpbt = bpt 1 + t 1 + xt 1 (60)
(56) and (57) imply that the aggregate ination rate, t, evolves according to
t =
1  

h
(1  !)(bpft   bPt) + !(bpbt   bPt)i (61)
Using (56), bpbt   bPt is given by bpbt   bPt = 11  t 1   t + xt 1 (62)
Rewriting (59) in terms of bpft   bPt yields
bpft   bPt = (1  )xt + Et(bpft+1   bPt) (63)
Combining (56), (57), and (62), Et(bpft+1   bPt) is given by
Et(bpft+1   bPt) = 1(1  )(1  !)Et(t+1   !t)  !(1  !)xt (64)
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Substituting (64) in (63), bpft   bPt is given by
bpft   bPt = (1  )xt + (1  )(1  !)Et(t+1   !t)  !(1  !)xt (65)
Substituting (62) and (65) in (61) yields the hybrid Phillips curve for price ination
t = fEtt+1 + bt 1 + 1xt + 2xt 1 (66)
where the parameters are
8><>:  = + !   (1  )!;f =

 ;b =
!
 ;2 =
(1 )!

1 =
(1 !) (1 )!
 ; =
(1 )(1 )( 1+$)
(1+$)
9>=>; (67)
7.2 The second-order approximation to the period utility
We pick on the choice of variables issue (Woodford (2003), p. 388). The scenario is the one of small
steady-state distortions, namely
Uc(Y ; 0) = O (kyk) (68)
What we show here is that, when (68) holds, a linear approximation to the production function is indeed
accurate for the purpose of policy analysis. Considering a rst-order and not a second-order approximation
to the production function does not alter the approximate welfare measure, still given by (41). The period
utility of the representative household, as a function solely of all yt(i), is given by
Ut = eu(Yt;et)  Z 1
0
ev(yt(i);et)di (69)
The rst term in (69) can be approximated to second order by
eu(Yt;et) = u+ euc eYt + euet + 12eucc eY 2t + euc eYtet + 12 e0teuet +O
y;e; %3 (70)
Substituting eYt = Y bYt and dropping the terms that are higher than second order, yields
eu(Yt;et) = u+ Y euc bYt + euet + 12Y 2eucc bY 2t + Y eucet bYt + 12 e0teuet +O
y;e; %3 (71)
Taking all the steps as in Woodford (2003, Appendix E:1) yields
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eu(Yt;et) = Y eucbYt   12 1 bY 2t +  1gt bYt

+ t:i:p+O
y;e; %3 (72)
The second term in (69), using eYt = Y bYt, can be approximated to second order by
ev(yt(i);et) = v+Y euc(1 y)byt(i)+evet+ 12Y 2evyybyt(i)2+Y evyetbyt(i)+ 12 e0teuet+O
y;e; %3 (73)
(73) delivers
Z 1
0
ev(yt(i);et)di = Y euc
8><>: (1  y)
bYt + 12$bY 2t  $qt bYt
+12(
 1 +$)varibyt(i)
9>=>;+ t:i:p+O
y;e; %3 (74)
Combining (72) and (74) yields
Ut = Y euc
8><>: y
bYt   12( 1 +$)bY 2t + ($qt +  1gt)bYt
 12( 1 +$)varibyt(i)
9>=>;+ t:i:p+O
y;e; %3 (75)
which then results in (41).
7.3 The second-order approximation to the discounted sum of utility
Under Calvo (1983) staggered pricesetting and backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters,
the distribution of prices in any period, fpt(i)g, consists of  times the distribution of prices in the previous
period, fpt 1(i)g, an atom of size (1   )(1   !) at the forward-looking reset price, pft , and an atom of
size (1  )! at the rule-of-thumb backward-looking reset price, pbt
fpt(i)g =  fpt 1(i)g+ (1  )(1  !)pft + (1  )!pbt (76)
Let t  vari log pt(i) denote the degree of price dispersion and P t  Ei flog pt(i)g denote the average
price, hence P t   P t 1 = Ei

log fpt(i)g   P t 1

. Recalling log pt = (1   !) log pft + ! log pbt and using
(76), P t   P t 1 can be rewritten as
P t   P t 1 =
0z }| {
Ei
flog pt 1(i)g   P t 1+ (1  )(1  !)(log pft   P t 1) + (1  )!(log pbt   P t 1)
= (1  )(log pt   P t 1) (77)
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Similarly, t can be rewritten as
t = vari

log fpt(i)g   P t 1

= Ei
n
log fpt(i)g   P t 1
2o  Ei log fpt(i)g   P t 12
=
264 Ei
n
log fpt 1(i)g   P t 1
2o
+ (1  )(1  !)(log pft   P t 1)2
+(1  )!(log pbt   P t 1)2   (P t   P t 1)2
375 (78)
P t is related to the Constant Elasticity of Substitution Dixit-Stiglitz (1967) price index through the
log-linear approximation
P t = logPt +O
1=2 1 ;e; %2 (79)
the second-order residual follows from the fact that the equilibrium ination process (as the equilibrium
output process) satises a bound of second order O(
e; %2) together with a second-order bound on
the initial (i.e. date  1, policy is implemented at date 0) degree of price dispersion,  1. Note that,
as in Woodford (2003),  1 is assumed to be of second order (that is why it enters the second-order
residual in (79) to the power of 1=2). It then follows that this measure of price dispersion continues to
be only of second order in the case of rst-order deviations of ination from zero. Recalling log pbt =
log pt 1 + t 1 + xt 1 and using (79), log pbt   P t 1 is given by
log pbt   P t 1 = log pt 1   P t 2   (P t 1   P t 2) + t 1 + xt 1
= log pt 1   P t 2 + xt 1 +O
1=2 1 ;e; %2 (80)
Recalling log pt = (1  !) log pft + ! log pbt , log pbt = log pt 1 + t 1 + xt 1, and using (79), log pft   P t 1
is given by
log pft   P t 1 =
1
1  ! log p

t  
!
1  ! (log p

t 1 + t 1 + xt 1)  P t 1
=
264 11 ! (log pt   P t 1)  !1 ! (log pt 1   P t 2)
  !1 !xt 1 +O
1=2 1 ;e; %2
375 (81)
Using (79), (77) becomes
t = (1  )(log pt   P t 1) +O
1=2 1 ;e; %2 (82)
29
Accordingly, (80) and (81) become respectively
log pbt   P t 1 =
1
1  t 1 + xt 1 +O
1=2 1 ;e; %2 (83)
log pft   P t 1 =
1
(1  !)(1  )t  
!
(1  !)(1  )t 1  
!
(1  !)xt 1 +O
1=2 1 ;e; %2 (84)
Substituting (79), (83), and (84) in (78) yields
t = t 1 +

(1  )
2
t +
!
(1  !)(1  ) [t   t 1   (1  )xt 1]
2 +O
1=2 1 ;e; %3
Integrating forward, starting from any small initial degree of price dispersion,  1, the degree of price
dispersion in any period t  0 is given by
t =
1X
s=0
t s
264 (1 )2t+
!
(1 !)(1 ) [t   t 1   (1  )xt 1]2
375+ t 1 1 +O1=2 1 ;e; %3 (85)
The term t 1 1 is independent of monetary policy. Taking the discounted value of (85) over all periods
t  0 gives
1X
t=0
tt =
1
1  
1X
t=0
t
266664

(1 )
2
t+
!
(1 !)(1 )
264 t   t 1
 (1  )xt 1
375
2
377775+ t:i:p+O
1=2 1 ;e; %3 (86)
Taking the discounted value of (41) over all periods t  0 yields
1X
t=0
tUt =  Y euc
2
"
( 1 +$)
1X
t=0
t(xt   x)2 + (1 +$)
1X
t=0
tt
#
+ t:i:p+O
y;e; %3 (87)
Substituting (86) in (87) and normalizing on ination, the discounted sum of utility of the representative
household can be approximated to second-order by
1X
t=0
tUt =  Y euc( 1 +$)
2
1X
t=0
t
266664
2t +

 (xt   x)2
+ !(1 !)
264 t   t 1
 (1  )xt 1
375
2
377775+t:i:p+O(
y;e; %;1=2 1 3) (88)
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8 Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Condition (45) has a solution with ination constant over time only if the Lagrange multiplier is
also constant over time. Substituting a constant value for the Lagrange multiplier in (45) and (46), the
two conditions can be simultaneously satised only if
 =
8><>:
f(1+2)[(1 )(1 )2]g+f(1 f b)[1 2(1 )22]g
(2+3)
x
+
(1 f b)1
(2+3)
9>=>; (89)
The hybrid Phillips curve (38) implies an upward-sloping relation
x =
(1  f   b)
(2 + 3)
 (90)
between long-run ination and long-run output gap. Combining (89) and (90) yields the optimal steady-
state ination
 =
(1  f   b)(2 + 3)1
(2 + 3)(2 + 3) + (1  f   b)
8><>:

(1  f   b)

1   2(1  )22
	
 f(2 + 3) [(1  )(1  )2]g
9>=>;
x (91)
The sign of the relationship is more easily determined by substituting for all the parameters in (91) in
terms of structural parameters (keeping  implicit)
 =
(1  )(1  ) 1! [(1  !)+ (1  )(1  )!]8><>: (1  !)(1  )(
 1   )(1  )2!
(1  !)+ (1  )2! [(1  !)+ (1  )(1  )!]
9>=>;
x (92)
which is (b). Given k > 0 and the rigour of mathematics (i.e.  = 1 is outside the range for  as it would
imply dividing by zero in deriving (38)), optimal long-run ination is always positive and collapses to
zero in the absence of backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour (i.e. ! = 0), in the absence of long-run
Phillips curve trade o¤ (i.e.  = 1), and in the absence of steady-state distortions (i.e. x = 0). We
now turn to the case of backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour by price setters a là Galì and Gertler
(1999). What constitutes optimal long-run ination is implied by setting  = 0 in (b). Here we prefer to
derive it. A central bank acting under commitment faces the problem of choosing bounded deterministic
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paths for ination and the output gap, ft; xtg1t=0, to minimise (43) subject to the constraint that the
sequences must satisfy (40) each period. We form the following Lagrangian
L =
1X
t=0
t

1
2

2t + 1(xt   x)2 + 2(t)2

+ 't

t   ft+1   bt 1   1xt

(93)
Di¤erentiating with respect to t and xt, we get the two rst-order conditions
t + 2(t   t 1)  2(t+1   t) + 't   f't 1   b't+1 = 0 (94)
1(xt   x)  1't = 0 (95)
for each t  0. Condition (94) has a solution with ination constant over time only if the Lagrange
multiplier is also constant over time. Substituting a constant value for the Lagrange multiplier in (94)
and (95), the two conditions can be simultaneously satised only if
 =  (1  f   b)1
1
(x  x) (96)
The hybrid Phillips curve (40) implies an upward-sloping relation
x =
(1  f   b)
1
 (97)
between long-run ination and long-run output gap. Combining (96) and (97) yields the optimal long-run
ination target
 =
(1  f   b)11
21 + (1  f   b)(1  f   b)1
x (98)
The sign of the relationship is more easily determined by substituting for all the parameters in (98)
in terms of structural parameters (keeping  implicit). Here, rather than simply substituting, we can
double-check the result obtained. Combining (95) and (94), optimal paths for ination and output gap
satisfy 264 t + !(1 !)(t   t 1)
  !(1 !)(t+1   t)
375 = 1
(1  !)
264 (xt 1   x) + !(xt+1   x)
 (xt   x)
375 (99)
Solving analytically for the optimal paths for ination and output gap would require combining (99) with
(40) and solve the resulting di¤erence equation. Here we are content with deriving the optimal long-run
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ination. The hybrid Phillips Curve (40) can be rewritten in terms of structural parameters as
xt =
1

(t   t+1)  !
(1  !)(t+1   t) +
!
(1  !)(t   t 1) (100)
where the equivalence t+1  !t+1   (1   !)t+1 is used to obtain a term in the rate of ination
acceleration at date t+ 1. Combining (99) and (100) optimal long-run ination is given by
 =
!(1  )(1  )
(1  !)+ !(1  )(1  )2x
 (101)
which is (a) (i.e. (98) in terms of structural parameters, (b) under  = 0). Given k > 0 and the rigour of
mathematics (i.e.  = 1 is outside the range for  as it would imply dividing by zero in deriving (40)),
optimal long-run ination is always positive and collapses to zero in the absence of backward-looking
rule-of-thumb behaviour (i.e. ! = 0), in the absence of long-run Phillips curve trade o¤ (i.e.  = 1), and
in the absence of steady-state distortions (i.e. x = 0).
9 Appendix C
A central bank acting under commitment faces the problem of choosing bounded deterministic paths for
ination and the output gap, ft; xtg1t=0, to minimise (55) subject to the constraint that the sequences
must satisfy (54) each period. We form the following Lagrangian.
L =
1X
t=0
t
8><>:
1
2

2t + n(xt   x)2

+'t [t   (1  ")t+1   "t 1   knxt]
9>=>; (102)
Di¤erentiating with respect to t and xt, we get the two rst-order conditions
t + 't   (1  ")'t 1   "'t+1 = 0 (103)
n(xt   x)  n't = 0 (104)
for each t  0. Condition (103) has a solution with ination constant over time only if the Lagrange
multiplier is also constant over time. Substituting a constant value for the Lagrange multiplier in (103)
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and (104), the two conditions can be simultaneously satised only if
 =  (1  )"n
n
(x  x) (105)
The hybrid Phillips curve (54) implies an upward-sloping relation
x =
(1  )(1  ")
n
 (106)
between long-run ination and long-run output gap. Combining (105) and (106) yields the optimal
long-run ination target
 =
(1  )"nn
2n + (1  ")(1  )2"n
x (107)
which is (c).
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